Week of January 6th, 2003

 

SIXTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF EMPLOYER WHERE EMPLOYER STOPPED USING SUBSTITUTE TEACHER BECAUSE OF CONCERNS OVER IMPROPER BEHAVIOR.

     In Lautermilch v. Findlay City Schools (6th Cir. January 3, 2003), (http://pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=03a0002p.06)  the plaintiff brought suit after the defendant stopped using him as a substitute teacher. The plaintiff began working for the defendant as a substitute teacher in 1996. In 1998, school officials began to have concerns regarding the plaintiff’s behavior as a substitute teacher, including “acting inappropriately with young people, tutoring a female student at his home, telling inappropriate jokes in the classroom, and commenting on the size of a female teacher's breasts.” One student stated that the plaintiff told her "Lips who [sic] touch alcohol may not touch mine, but it does not rule out any other part of my body."  The plaintiff admitted that he did tutor a female student in his home, and that he had made the "lips who touch alcohol" comment without "that vulgar addition to the end of it." The plaintiff stated that at a November 1998 meeting, the principal told him that he was "too macho" and that the principal  "spit the word macho out as if it was distasteful." Because of this behavior, the defendant did not call the plaintiff to be a substitute teacher.

            The plaintiff brought suit alleging sex discrimination, constitutional violations and state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. First, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff could not state a claim for a due process violation because state law conferred no property interest in his job and he was an at-will employee. The Court of Appeals also found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination or produce evidence that the reasons given for the refusal to reemploy were pretextual. The Court found that the principal’s comment that the plaintiff was “too macho” was not evidence of sex discrimination. The Court of Appeals stated that “when the comment is placed in the context of the termination hearing documenting specific allegations of misconduct, any reasonable trier of fact would conclude that the comment was critical of [the plaintiff’s] behavior, not his sex or gender.” The Court of Appeals concluded by finding that the plaintiff did not have a valid first amendment claim, because his speech did not address a matter of public concern.